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Previous literature has shown that public provision of private goods can be a welfare-
enhancing device in second-best settings where governments pursue redistributive goals. 
However, three issues have so far been neglected. First, the case for supplementing an optimal 
nonlinear income tax with public provision of private goods has been made in models where 
agents differ only in terms of market ability. Second, the magnitude of the welfare gains 
achievable through public provision schemes has not been assessed. Third, the 
similarities/differences between public provision schemes and tagging schemes have not been 
thoroughly analyzed. Our purpose in this paper is therefore threefold: first, to extend previous 
contributions by incorporating in the theoretical analysis both heterogeneity in market ability 
and in the need for the publicly provided good; second, to perform numerical simulations to 
quantify the size of the potential welfare gains achievable by introducing a public provision 
scheme, and to characterize the conditions under which these welfare gains are sizeable; 
finally, to compare the welfare gains from public provision with the welfare gains from 
tagging. 
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For a long time the conventional wisdom among economists has maintained that
only public goods should be publicly provided and that cash transfers dominate in-kind
transfers as a vehicle to attain redistributive goals. The latter prescription was grounded
on the observation that, while in-kind transfers constrain the behavior of their recipients,
cash transfers do not. However, virtually all governments conduct a signicant amount
of redistribution through in-kind programs and provide a large variety of goods that
are basically private in nature.1 A variety of reasons has over time been put forward
to rationalize this preference for redistributing in-kind rather than in cash.2 Our paper
relates to what can be labelled the \self-targeting" justication for in-kind transfers,
namely the idea that, in a second-best setting, they may serve as a screening device
between those who are the intended beneciaries of the government's redistributive policy
and those who are not. Such a rationale for in-kind transfers was already contained in
the contributions by Nichols and Zeckhauser (1982) and Guesnerie and Roberts (1984),
but it is only since the beginning of the nineties that scholars have started to incorporate
public provision of private goods into an otherwise standard optimal nonlinear income
taxation model.3 These more recent contributions have shown that public provision
(hereafter simply PP) of private goods can alleviate the informational problems that
restrict redistribution when the identity of high- and low-skilled agents is hidden and the
only information available to the government pertains to the distribution of abilities in
the population and the form of the individuals' utility function.4
There are three issues that have not yet been addressed in the literature and that
we intend to consider in this paper. The rst is that the case for supplementing an
optimal nonlinear income tax with PP of private goods has been made in models where
agents dier only in terms of market ability. However, if one thinks of some of the
examples of welfare-enhancing publicly provided goods that are typically cited in the
literature, as for instance child-care services or elderly-care services, it is apparent that
1Public provision of private goods often represents an amount close to 20% of GDP.
2See Currie and Gahvari (2008) for a recent survey.
3Throughout the paper we use the expressions \in-kind transfers" and \public provision of private
goods" as synonimous.
4See e.g. Blomquist and Christiansen (1995), Boadway and Marchand (1995), Cremer and Gahvari
(1997), Balestrino (2000) Pirttil and Tuomala (2002) and Micheletto (2004).
2not all agents need the publicly provided good. Since the results derived in previous
contributions do not necessarily carry over in a simple way to models where agents dier
along several dimensions, it is important to investigate the eects of in-kind transfers
in models with heterogeneity both in skills and in needs for the publicly provided good.
Another issue that has been neglected in the literature is the quantitative assessment of
the welfare gains achievable through PP of private goods. Previous contributions have
been conned to theoretical modelling; it is still an open question whether the welfare
gains from PP of private goods are signicant or negligible. Finally, the literature has
so far failed to recognize that there are some interesting similarities/dierences between
PP schemes and tagging schemes.
In this paper we provide a comprehensive assessment of the welfare gains achievable
by PP in a model where (realistically) only a fraction of individuals need the publicly
provided good. Moreover, we investigate whether the presence of a general nonlinear
income tax is crucial for public provision to be welfare enhancing, or if welfare gains of
similar magnitudes are achievable with linear or piece-wise linear tax schedules like those
observed in real world economies. We also compare PP with tagging: both instruments
relieve informational frictions but act on dierent self-selection constraints; it is therefore
interesting to quantitatively assess which instrument is the more powerful redistributive
device in realistically calibrated economies. One reason why we nd this comparison
particularly interesting is that tagging- and PP schemes are likely to have very dierent
political appeal. Indeed, one of the key messages of our paper is that, as an instrument
for targeting needy subgroups in the population, PP can serve in many relevant cases
as a valid and politically viable substitute for tagging schemes which are likely to be
deemed politically unfeasible.
We will use two dierent models in our analysis. The rst is an implementation of
an extended discrete-type optimal taxation model of the kind analyzed in Blomquist
et al. (2010), which in turn builds on the Stern (1982) and Stiglitz (1982) two-type
version of the Mirrlees' (1971) optimal nonlinear taxation model. The second model
employs an empirically relevant labor supply specication and employs a large sample
of discrete taxpayer types derived from the Swedish population distribution. For this
model we derive optimal linear and piece-wise linear tax schedules like in Stern (1976)
3and Slemrod et al. (1994) respectively. To our knowledge the present paper is the rst
to analyze PP or tagging together with piece-wise linear tax schedules.
The results from our calibrated model indicate that the welfare gains from PP can be
substantial, at least if the policy maker has access to a general nonlinear tax. Sizeable
welfare gains are also achievable under a (4-brackets)-piece-wise linear tax, but are very
small under a linear tax. Moreover, tagging and PP are almost equivalent, in terms of
welfare gains, under an unrestricted nonlinear income tax or a 4-brackets-piecewise-linear
income tax.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we rst present a simple theoretical
optimal nonlinear income taxation model where agents dier both in skills and in needs
for the publicly provided good. We then proceed by discussing how the pure income
tax optimum can be improved upon by using a PP scheme, and we contrast the eects
of a PP scheme with those descending from tagging. Section 3 presents the results
from the numerical simulations performed on the stylized model,including an estimate
of the welfare gains achievable by alternatively using PP or tagging. Section 4 develops
our empirically driven simulation approach and extends the analysis of the eects of
PP and tagging to settings where the income tax at disposal of the government is less
sophisticated (linear or piecewise-linear) than the one assumed in section 2. Finally,
section 5 oers concluding remarks.
2. The model
Our theoretical model is an extension of the one considered in a recent contribution
by Blomquist et al. (2010). In that paper the authors analyzed the desirability of a PP
scheme that had not been previously addressed in the literature, and they did so in an
optimal nonlinear income taxation model where agents were assumed to dier only in
terms of skills. The novelty of the PP scheme was that the publicly provided good was
delivered free of charge and public budget balance was attained by adjusting the shape of
the income tax. Another feature of their model was that the good x which was candidate
for PP was a good that didn't enter the agents' utility function directly, but had to be
acquired in order to work. In particular, for all agents the demand for the good was
related to the hours of work through the same monotonically increasing function f, so
4that x = f (h), where h denoted hours of work
Extending the Blomquist et al. (2010) paper to a bi-dimensional setting, we focus
for illustrative purposes on child care services as a candidate for public provision. Ac-
cordingly, we regard agents as diering in terms of both labor productivity (wage rates)
and need for child care services. Those who need child care services in order to work are
for simplicity labelled \parents" (rather than \parents with children in child care age").
It is important to emphasize right from the outset that what we have in mind as an
empirical counterpart of this label is, more properly, the so called \secondary earner" in
couples with children in child care age, or the lone parents (of young children) when the
household is not a couple. The reason is that these are the agents whose labor supply
is primarily aected by the availability of child care services, and in this sense they can
be singled out as the \users" of the publicly provided private good on which we focus.
Thus, albeit in the paper we refer for simplicity to \parents" and \non-parents", one has
to bear in mind that for our purposes the group of parents represents only a subset of the
parents with young children, and that this subset consists to a large extent of mothers
of young children.
We let Y denote the before tax labor income, given by the product between an agent's
wage rate w and labor supply h. We also make the standard assumption that the policy
maker can observe Y but not w or h separately. Each agent chooses how much labor to
supply and the corresponding consumption level, which depends on the tax liability.
Throughout the paper, we use the expression \agents of ability (or skill) type i" to
refer to agents earning a wage rate wi. There are in the population n dierent ability
types of agents ordered in such a way that w1 < w2 < ::: < wn. The population size is
normalized to unity, the proportion of agents of ability type i is i, and i 2 [0;1] denotes
the proportion of parents among agents of ability type i. The government knows both i
and i for all i 2 f1;:::;ng. The (exogenous) per unit resource cost of child care services
(which would be the price in a competitive market) is denoted by q. Non-parents do
not need child care services. For parents, on the other hand, the demand for child care
services is strictly related to the hours of work. Assuming that every parent has only one
child, for every hour of work parents need one hour of child care services.5 Child care
5This assumption is made for simplicity and it does not aect the qualitative results.
5services do not represent a good that enters the parents' utility function directly; it entails
for them a real cost of working, a good which must be acquired in order to work. Thus,
in an economy without taxes and public expenditure, the opportunity cost of leisure,
which governs the agents' decisions in an undistorted optimum, is equal to w  w   q
and w for, respectively, parents and non-parents. All agents have identical preferences
over consumption and hours of work, represented by the utility function u(c;h).6
2.1. A pure income tax optimum
Let's start with a characterization of the solution to the government's problem in
the absence of public provision. The government's objective is to maximize a weighted
sum of agents' utilities. For this purpose, the government has at its disposal a nonlinear
income tax T (Y ). Based on the link between pre-tax earnings and post-tax earnings
implied by the tax schedule, agents choose labor supply to maximize utility. This allows
to implicitly express the marginal tax rates faced by agents as T0 (Y ) = 1   MRS,
where MRS denotes the marginal rate of substitution between gross labor income and
consumption. Dening by B = Y   T (Y ) the after-tax income associated with gross
labor income Y , the government's problem can be equivalently stated as the problem of
selecting bundles in the (Y;B)-space subject to a set of self-selection constraints and a
public budget constraint. The self-selection constraints require that each agent (weakly)
prefers the bundle intended for him/her to that intended for some other agent. An agent
that chooses a bundle intended for someone else is called \mimicker".
Given that consumption is determined for parents as C = B   qh = B   qY=w and
for non-parents as C = B, we can dene the agents' indirect utility at any given point in
the (Y;B)-space as V i;p (B;Y ) = u
 
B   qY=wi;Y=wi




for respectively parents and non-parents of ability type i. As customary in asymmetric
information optimal taxation models, the relative slope of the indierence curves of
various agents in the (Y;B)-space plays an important role. In models where agents only
dier along the wage rate dimension, (weak) normality of consumption is a sucient
condition to ensure that the agent monotonicity property holds. This property implies
that, at any given point in the (Y;B)-space, the indierence curves are atter the higher
6In this paper we disregard other possible costs or benets of having children.
6the wage rate of an agent. In our model where agents also dier according to whether
they are parents or not, one might be tempted to conjecture that, in a setting without
public provision of child care services, a similar property holds once the wage rates for
parents are considered net of the unitary cost of child care services. This conjecture is
however wrong, at least for a general utility function u(c;h). To see this, consider a
parent earning a unitary wage rate wp and a non-parent earning a unitary wage rate
wnp = wp   q. If the conjecture were correct, these two agents should have equally
sloped indierence curves at any bundle in the (Y;B)-space.7 However, if we calculate











































for the non-parent agent. It is easy to recognize that there is no reason to expect that
the values of (1) and (2) coincide.
The fact that the agent monotonicity property might not hold in our setting implies
that the single-crossing property might be violated too. The solution to the government's
problem might therefore not satisfy the monotonic chain to the left property.8 For this
reason we write the government's problem incorporating all the possible self-selection
constraints.
Denoting by i;p the welfare weight used by the government for parents of ability
type i (i = 1;:::;n) and by i;np the welfare weight applied to non-parents of ability type
7Notice that in a laissez faire equilibrium a parent with wage rate wp and a non-parent with wage
rate wnp = wp   q would behave identically, and get the same level of utility, since their preferences in
the (h;c)-space, as well as their budget set, are the same. In a laissez faire equilibrium a parent earning
a unitary wage rate wp would maximize u(c;h) subject to the budget constraint c = wph   qh whereas
a non-parent earning a unitary wage rate wnp would maximize u(c;h) subject to the budget constraint
c = wnph. When wnp = wp   q the two problems, and their solution, coincide.
8This property is satised when the only binding self-selection constraints are those running down-
wards and linking pair of adjacent types. For further details, see Guesnerie and Seade (1982).






i;np = 1, the optimal taxation problem (hereafter OT










V i;p(Bi;p;Y i;p)  V i;p(Bj;p;Y j;p); i;j 2 f1;:::;ng;i 6= j (i;p;j;p)
V i;p  
Bi;p;Y i;p
 V i;p(Bj;np;Y j;np); i;j 2 f1;:::;ng; (i;p;j;np)
V i;np(Bi;np;Y i;np)  V i;np(Bj;np;Y j;np); i;j 2 f1;:::;ng;i 6= j (i;np;j;np)




(Y i;p   Bi;p)i + (Y i;np   Bi;np)(1   i)

 0;()
where Lagrange multipliers are within parentheses, the rst four sets of constraints rep-
resent the self-selection constraints, and the last constraint is the government's budget
constraint.
The rst set of self-selection constraints (i;p;j;p-constraints) incorporates all the pos-
sible constraints linking a parent of a given ability type to a parent of a dierent ability
type. The second set (i;p;j;np-constraints) contains all the possible constraints requiring
that a parent of a given ability type should not be tempted to choose a bundle intended
for a non-parent. For simplicity, we can label these two sets of constraints as respectively
the parent/parent self-selection constraints and the parent/non-parent self-selection con-
straints. Adapting this terminology to the last two sets of incentive constraints, we can
see that the third set (i;np;j;np-constraints) contains all the possible non-parent/non-
parent self-selection constraints and the fourth set (i;np;j;p-constraints) all the possible
non-parent/parent self-selection constraints.
Grouping the self-selection constraints in this way is convenient for the purpose of
highlighting the welfare properties of PP. As we will soon explain in more details, the
8reason is that PP alleviates only some of the self-selection constraints, whereas it may
have no eect or even exacerbate some other self-selection constraints.
Presenting the self-selection constraints as above is also useful to illustrate the relative
merits of PP- versus tagging schemes. Anticipating what will be claried below, the
reason is that these two schemes interact in a dierent way with the dierent sets of
self-selection constraints.
Intuition therefore suggests that whether a PP scheme outperforms a tagging scheme
or not depends on which self-selection constraints represent for the government, at the
solution to the OT problem, the most severe obstacle in achieving the redistributive
goals.
Manipulating the rst order conditions of the OT problem above, one can easily show































whereas the general expression for the marginal tax rate faced by a non-parent of ability






























The results provided by (3)-(4) are quite standard and we do not discuss them at
length. The only reason to distort agents' (labor supply) behavior is the presence of
binding self-selection constraints. Eq. (3) tells us that if there are agents, other than
parents of ability type i, who are indierent between choosing the bundle intended for
9them and the bundle intended for parents of ability type i, the labor supply of the latter
has to be distorted to deter mimicking. Similarly, eq. (4) tells us that if there are agents,
other than non-parents of ability type i, who are indierent between choosing the bundle
intended for them and the bundle intended for non-parents of ability type i, the labor
supply of the latter has to be distorted to prevent mimicking.
Notice that, in contrast to what happens in standard OT models, we cannot rule
out the possibility that for some of the marginal income tax rates, as dened by (3)-
(4), more than one self-selection constraint is binding at the same time. In particular,
the monotonic-chain-to-the-left property is no longer necessarily satised since, as we
previously pointed out, the agent monotonicity assumption is likely to be violated.
Let's consider now what happens when public provision of child care services is in-
troduced.
2.2. An optimum with public provision
Following Blomquist et al. (2010) we consider a PP scheme which is entirely nanced
through the income tax and where people can get free of charge as much child care
services as they need.9 In such a setting all agents, irrespective of whether they are
parents or not, have at any given point in the (Y;B)-space an indirect utility which is





.10 In other words, child care purchases no longer
appear in the (private) budget constraints of parents but instead enter the government's
budget constraint. Dening i, for i = 1;:::;n as i  i;p + i;np, the income-tax-








9Notice that our assumptions imply that the demand for child care is characterized by satiation
conditional on labor supply. Without satiation, it would not be possible to oer any amount free of
charge as agents would expand their consumption beyond any reasonable limit, unless some private
disutility (time costs, etc.) is incurred in order to consume the publicly provided good.
10Therefore, as compared to the case considered in the previous section, the parents' indierence curves
in the (Y;B)-space are likely to become atter. This certainly happens when the agents' preferences are
quasi-linear in consumption, in which case the parents' indierence curves atten by the amount q=w.
More generally, the parents' indierence curves atten after the introduction of the PP scheme provided
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where the presence of a single set of self-selection constraints reects the fact that with PP
the agents' behavior only depends on their ability type and no longer on their parental
status. Before characterizing analytically the expressions for the marginal tax rates
faced by the various agents under an income-tax-cum-public-provision optimum, let's
rst consider how the introduction of PP is going to aect the self-selection constraints
faced by the government. Previous contributions have pointed out how, when agents
dier only in terms of ability and the government aims at redistributing from the high-
skilled to the low-skilled, the PP of a complementary-to-labor good allows achieving a
Pareto-improvement upon the pure income tax optimum.11 The logic of the argument
can be easily illustrated by referring to our model above. The analysis is simplied by
analyzing separately the dierent patterns of self-selection constraints which can arise in
the economy.
2.2.1. Disjoint wage supports
Suppose all agents of ability types k 2 f1;:::;ig are parents and all agents of ability
types z 2 fi + 1;:::;ng are non-parents. Suppose further that a fully separating equilib-
rium with Y 1 < ::: < Y n is achieved as the solution to the government's OT problem.
Finally, suppose that at the solution to the OT problem the only binding self-selection
constraints run downwards from higher ability agents to lower ability agents. To show




the bundle oered to agents of skill type j = 1;:::;n at the so-
lution to the OT problem. Let agents get the amount of child care services that they
want and, instead of the original set of bundles
 
Y j;Bj
, oer the following packages:
11See Blomquist et al. (2010).
11 
Y 1;B1   qY 1=w1
,...,
 




,..., (Y n;Bn). Notice
that, by keeping after the reform their labor supply at the original pre-reform level, the
utility of all agents would be unaected and the government's budget constraint would
still be satised since the tax payment of each type of parents has been increased just
enough to cover the cost of publicly provided services demanded by that type (qY j=wj
for j = 1;:::i). The only eects of the reform that are left to evaluate are those on the
binding self-selection constraints.
Consider rst the self-selection constraints requiring higher ability non-parents to
be prevented from mimicking lower ability non-parents. Clearly, these self-selection con-
straints are unaected by the proposed reform. Consider now the self-selection constraint
requiring a non-parent of ability type i + 1 to be prevented from mimicking a parent of
ability type i. By assumption, this was the only binding self-selection constraint link-
ing parents and non-parents at the solution to the OT problem. It should be apparent
that this self-selection constraint is weakened by the proposed reform. The reason is
that the consumption that a type i + 1 agent can get by mimicking a type i agent is
now lower (by the amount qY i=wi) than before the reform, whereas the labor eort
that he/she has to exert has not changed. A similar reasoning leads to the conclusion
that also all the self-selection constraints requiring higher ability parents to be prevented
from mimicking lower ability parents are relaxed. The consumption that a parent of skill
type j   1 can get by mimicking a parent of skill type j is now lower (by the amount
q

Y j 1=wj 1   Y j 1=wj
) than before the reform, whereas the labor eort that he/she
has to exert has not changed. We can therefore conclude that PP is an unambiguously
welfare-enhancing instrument in this case. We can also notice, by comparing the extra
burden that it imposes on a type i+1 mimicker as compared to the extra burden imposed
on a type j 2 f2;:::;ig mimicker, that it is an especially eective policy instrument when
it comes to deterring non-parents from mimicking parents.12
12The extra burden placed on skill type i + 1 mimickers (who are non-parents) depends only on the
labor supply of the mimicked agents (who are the parents of skill type i). The extra burden placed on
mimickers of skill type j 2 f2;:::ig (who are parents) depends instead on the positive dierence between
the labor supply of the mimicked and the labor supply of the mimicker. The smaller this dierence, the
smaller the extra burden placed on the mimicker by the introduction of PP.
122.2.2. Overlapping wage supports
Let's now modify slightly our example and introduce overlapping wage supports for
parents and non-parents. For this purpose, let's assume that n, the number of dierent
ability types in the economy, is an even number and that for i 2 f1;2;3;:::;n=2g all
agents of ability type k = 2i   1 are parents whereas all agents of ability type z = 2i
are non-parents. Suppose again that a fully separating equilibrium with Y 1 < ::: < Y n
is achieved as the solution to the government's OT problem and that the only binding
self-selection constraints run downwards and link pair of adjacent types. What would
be the eects of introducing PP in a set-up like this? To answer this question consider
the eects of a reform shaped along the same lines as above, and denote by
 
Y j;Bj
the bundle oered to agents of type j = 1;:::;n at the solution to the OT problem in
the absence of PP. As before, let agents get the amount of child care services that they
want and, instead of the original set of bundles
 
Y j;Bj
, oer the following packages:
 
Y k;Bk   qY k=wk
and (Y z;Bz) where i 2 f1;2;3;:::;n=2g, k = 2i   1 and
z = 2i. Once again, by keeping after the reform their labor supply at the original pre-
reform level, the utility of all agents would be unaected and the government's budget
constraint would still be satised. Consider any of the self{selection constraints requiring
a non-parent of ability type z to be prevented from mimicking a parent of ability type
z   1. These constraints are weakened since the consumption that a type z agent can
get by mimicking a type z   1 agent is now lower (by the amount qY z 1=wz 1) than
before the reform, whereas the labor eort that he/she has to exert has not changed.
So far the analysis has conrmed the virtue of PP as an instrument to alleviate the
incentive problems faced by the government. Moreover, since by assumption we have
n=2 self-selection constraints involving non-parents being tempted to mimic parents, the
eect of the introduction of PP is potentially quite strong. However, we need to evaluate
the eects produced on the remaining (n=2)   1 binding self-selection constraints, those
requiring parents of ability type k to be prevented from mimicking non-parents of ability
type k   1.13 In this case the proposed reform has a perverse eect on the mimicking
incentives. In fact, at the pre-reform equilibrium a parent of ability type k was assumed
13The number of binding self-selection constraints is in this case equal to (n=2)   1 due to the fact
that, according to our assumptions, parents of ability type 1 are not tempted to mimic anyone else.
13to be indierent between choosing the bundle intended for him/her (Y k;Bk) and
the one intended for a non-parent of ability type k   1 (Y k 1;Bk 1). After the
reform, his/her utility as a non-mimicker would be unchanged: he/she would still work
for Y k=wk hours and consume Bk   qY k=wk. His/her utility as a mimicker, on
the other hand, would increase: mimicking a type k   1 non-parent would still require
to work for Y k 1=wk hours, as before the reform, but consumption would increase
from Bk 1   qY k 1=wk to Bk 1. Thus, the proposed reform has a detrimental
eect on all the binding self-selection constraints requiring parents of ability type k to
be prevented from mimicking non-parents of ability type k  1. This means that it is no
longer obvious that PP can be used to accomplish a Pareto improving reform.
2.2.3. Intersecting wage supports
Finally, let's abandon the assumption that for each given ability type either all agents
are parents or all agents are non-parents. Then, another eect of the PP scheme is that
at the solution to the income-tax-cum-public-provision problem the government is forced
to pool all agents of a given ability type, irrespective of their parental status. The reason
is apparent. With the introduction of the PP scheme the shape of the agents' indierence
curves in the (Y;B)-space only depends on the agents' gross wage rate w; parental status
becomes irrelevant. Thus, parents and non-parents, provided that they are of the same
ability type, become indiscernible with PP in the sense that they cannot be separated by
properly designing the nonlinear income tax. It is however worth pointing out that PP
might in some other cases help the government to screen between groups of agents that
would be pooled under a pure income tax optimum. For instance, if a parent has a net
hourly wage rate w   q which is close enough to the hourly wage rate of a non-parent,
it could be the case that the government pool them together at the solution to the OT
problem. With the PP scheme in place, on the other hand, it would be easier for the
government to separate the two groups of agents.
2.2.4. Optimal marginal tax rates
We are now ready to characterize optimal marginal tax rates. Manipulating the rst
order conditions of the government's problem, the general expression for the marginal
















5 + i q
wi: (5)
Given that the agent monotonicity assumption is recovered with the introduction of
PP, and under the reasonable assumption that the government aims at redistributing
from the higher ability types to the lower ability types, the solution to the PP problem
entails a simple monotonic chain to the left. We would therefore have
T0 (Y n) = n q
wn; (6)












A special case of (6)-(7) occurs when, for any given ability type, either all agents are
parents or all agents are non-parents. The government would then not be forced to pool
some parents with some non-parents and oer them the same allocation in the (Y;B)-
space. An equilibrium which is fully separable in this sense is in principle attainable and
the deltas appearing in the equations (6)-(7) would either take a value equal to 0 (for
the ability types represented solely by non-parents) or equal to 1 (for the ability types
represented solely by parents). If this is the case, the expressions dening the marginal
tax rates faced by the various non-parents only incorporate a self-selection term, whereas
those dening the marginal tax rates for the various parents incorporate a self-selection
term plus a q=w term, with w depending on the specic wage rate of the parents under
consideration.
An interesting thing to notice about (6)-(7) when i 2 f0;1g 8i 2 f1;:::;ng is that,
even if the introduction of PP is likely to lead to an increase in some of the marginal
tax rates (those for parents, due to the presence of the q=w terms), total distortions in
the economy may still be reduced. Intuitively, the q=w terms that enter the expressions
for the marginal tax rates faced by parents do not represent distortionary terms but,
as emphasized in Blomquist et al. (2010), serve the same role as a market price in
15letting parents face the right incentives.14 On the other hand, PP serves the purpose
of weakening some of the binding self-selection constraints. For these constraints the
mimicking-deterring-eect makes less urgent the need to distort agents for self-selection
purposes and therefore allows reducing the truly distortionary component (i.e. the -
terms) in the formulas for the marginal tax rates. Notice also that in this fully separating
equilibrium the expressions for the marginal tax rates that apply to non-parents do not
incorporate the q=w terms. This is important since these terms would for them represent
a truly distortionary component.15
In the general case when i is not restricted to be either equal to 0 or 1, PP forces
the government to oer the same (Y;B)-bundle to both parents and non-parents of
a same ability type i. With respect to the marginal tax rates, this partial pooling
feature of the solution to the PP problem has the unappealing consequence that the
distortion faced by the non-parents of ability type i is likely to be exacerbated by the
introduction of PP. The reason is that their marginal tax rate also incorporates a term
that reects the marginal resource cost of the publicly provided service used by the
parents of ability type i with whom they are pooled. Raising the marginal tax rate by
q=wi is non-distortive and fully corrective for type i parents but it is a fully distortive
term for type i non-parents. The government is therefore faced with the trade-o between
raising the distortion on type i non-parents and correcting the distortion imposed on
type i parents by the introduction of the free of charge PP scheme. According to (6)-(7)
this trade-o is solved raising the value of the marginal tax rate by an amount which
is smaller than the one required to fully correct the behavior of type i parents.16 In
particular, as the proportion of parents among type i agents becomes larger and larger,
the increase in the marginal tax rate becomes closer and closer to the one required to
fully correct the behavior of type i parents. Finally, notice that for non-parents the
marginal tax rates dened by (6)-(7) are entirely distortionary, whereas for parents the
14It forces parents to internalize the resource cost of child care which they would face in a competitive
market where child care services are privately purchased.
15Notice however that the fact that the cost of child care is not mirrored in the expressions for the
marginal tax rates that apply to non-parents does not mean that the additional resources needed to
nance the PP of child care are raised only from parents. It means that if non-parents participate too
in the nancing of the PP of child care services, the additional revenue extracted from them may to a
large extent be collected in a non-distortionary way through an increase in inframarginal tax rates.
16From this point of view we can say that type i parents are induced to work too much and type i
non-parents too little.







  (1   z)q=wz in the case of (7).
After having considered the eects of PP, in the next section we briey discuss the
case where the government supplements income taxation with a tagging scheme.
2.3. An optimum with tagging
The basic distinguishing mechanism in the tagging problem as compared to the OT
problem outlined in section 2.1 is that with tagging the population may be disaggregated
into groups, using some observable characteristic or \tag", to each of whom a dierent
nonlinear income tax schedule applies.17 The government then solves a set of separate
optimal income tax problems, one for each of the tagged groups, with the possibility
of accomplishing lump-sum inter-group transfers. Taking as a benchmark the solution
to the OT problem, the welfare-enhancing potential of a tagging scheme comes from
the possibility to eliminate all self-selection constraints linking agents belonging to two
separate tagged groups.
In our model with parents and non-parents, one could view parental status as a
possible tag that allows disaggregating the population into two separate groups with
two distinct tax schedules applying to parents and non-parents. From a formal point
of view, however, we can still set up the government's problem in the way we did for
the OT problem presented in section 2.1, the only dierence being that we can now
neglect all the parent/non-parent- and the non-parent/parent self-selection constraints
since they will necessarily be slack. The income-tax-cum-tagging problem (hereafter TG
problem) can therefore be written taking the OT problem of section 2.1 and setting
i;np;j;p = i;p;j;np = 0.
Manipulating the rst order conditions of the TG problem, the general expression for

















17The term \tagging" was coined by Akerlof (1978) to describe the use of taxes that are contingent
on personal characteristics. More recent contributions on tagging and taxation include Immonen et al.
(1998), Boadway and Pestieau (2006) Cremer et al. (2010).


















Before concluding this section and resorting to numerical simulations to assess the
welfare properties of PP versus tagging, notice that the desirability of both PP and
tagging hinges on the eects exerted on the self-selection constraints thwarting the gov-
ernment in pursuing its redistributive goals. There are however two main dierences.
The rst is that PP acts on the incentive constraints both within- and across groups,
whereas tagging prevents mimicking across groups but is ineective in alleviating in-
centives problems within groups. The second dierence is that PP might relax some
incentive constraints and tighten some others, whereas tagging never tightens incentive
constraints. This also implies that tagging, contrary to PP, always allows achieving a
Pareto improvement upon the pure income tax optimum.18
3. The importance of the wage distribution overlap: numerical simulations
To provide additional insights, we perform numerical simulations on three variants of
a simple model with just four dierent groups of agents. The purpose is to highlight that
the eectiveness of PP and tagging in slackening self-selection constraints is aected
both by the way users and non-users are distributed across ability types and by the
redistributive tastes of the government. To assess the sensitivity of results on the degree
of social aversion to inequality, we consider the two polar cases of a utilitarian social
welfare function and of a max-min social welfare function. Regarding the distribution of
users and non-users across ability types, we consider the following three cases:
18It is however also true that the introduction of a PP scheme always allows achieving a Pareto
improvement upon the solution to the government's TG problem. The reason is that tagging eliminates
all the self-selection constraints linking parents to non-parents and vice versa. PP would then only aect
the self-selection constraints linking parents to parents and we know that in this case its eect would
be benecial, provided that the government aims at redistributing from the relatively well-o to the
relatively worse-o.
18Case 1 (disjoint). agents can be of four dierent ability types characterized by the wage
rates w1 < w2 < w3 < w4; all agents of ability type 1 and 2 are parents whereas all
agents of ability type 3 and 4 are non-parents;
Case 2 (overlapping). agents can be of four dierent ability types characterized by the
wage rates w1 < w2 < w3 < w4; all agents of ability type 1 and 3 are parents whereas
all agents of ability type 2 and 4 are non-parents;
Case 3 (pooling). agents can be of three dierent ability types characterized by the wage
rates w1 < w2 < w3; all agents of ability type 1 are parents and all agents of ability
type 3 are non-parents; as regards agents of ability type 2, there are among them both
parents and non-parents.
3.1. Parameterization
In this section we employ the following utility function commonly used in the optimal
taxation literature




where we set k = 2 implying a compensated elasticity of labor supply equal to 1/3. For
both case 1 and case 2 the values of wages are w1 = 2, w2 = 2:8, w3 = 4:2 and w4 = 6,
and the benchmark level of the price of child care is q = 1. For case 3 the values of wages
are w1 = 1, w2 = 2 and w3 = 3, and the benchmark level of q is 0:5.19 For all cases we
present results for economies where the proportion of parents is equal to 15% and 30%.20
Since it is of interest to compare the eects of the introduction of a PP scheme with those
produced by supplementing optimal income taxation with tagging, we also calculate the
solution to the government's problem under the assumption that two separate nonlinear
income tax schedules apply to parents and non-parents. Finally, we also investigate the
combined eect of both PP and tagging.
19The values of q have been chosen so that the ratio q=w1 approximately mimics empirically relevant
magnitudes of the fraction of the wage spent on child-care services for low earners which has been shown
to lie around 45% (See Blomquist et al. (2010)).
20Parents are always assumed to be equally distributed between low-skilled parents and high-skilled
parents. The same is true for non-parents.
193.2. Results
The results of our simulations are presented in appendix A. Tables A1-A3 provide
the results for the utilitarian social welfare function; Tables A4-A6 those for the max-
min social welfare function. The \disjoint" case is considered in Tables A1 and A4,
the \overlapping" case in Tables A2 and A5, and the \pooling" case in Tables A3 and
A6. Each table presents the pre-tax labor income and marginal tax rate for the various
agents under the pure income-tax optimum (OT), the income-tax-cum-public-provision
optimum (PP), the tagging optimum (TG), and the optimum where tagging and public
provision are jointly used (TG+PP). The welfare gains associated with each of the three
deviations from the pure income tax optimum are reported at the bottom of the various
tables.
With one exception, the introduction of PP always raises the marginal tax rates
faced by parents.21 However, taking into account that under the PP scheme part of the
marginal tax rate faced by parents represents a non-distortionary component, the truly
distortionary component is lower for parents under an optimum with PP than under a
pure income tax optimum.22 With respect to the low-skilled non-parents, we nd that in
case 1 (and to a lesser extent also in case 3) PP implies a reduction in the marginal tax
rate, whereas in case 2 it entails an increase in the marginal tax rate, especially under
a max-min social welfare function.23 Relying on the discussion contained in section 2.2,
the increase observed in case 2 can be interpreted as a consequence of the fact that the
provision scheme tightens the self-selection constraint requiring type 3 agents (parents)
not to mimic type 2 agents (non-parents).
In accordance with the eect on the equilibrium marginal tax rates, we nd that the
introduction of the PP scheme tends to boost the labor supply of parents. In general also
21The exception is represented by the marginal tax rates faced by the high-skilled parents in case 3
when the government maximizes a max-min objective function. Under the OT solution the high-skilled
parents do not work and face a quite high marginal tax rate (75%). The marginal tax rate is lowered by
the introduction of PP since it becomes optimal for the government to let high-skilled parents participate
in the labor market.
22The only exception is represented by the high-skilled parents under a max-min social welfare function
and an overlapping wage distribution. As we have discussed in section 2.2 the distortionary component
of the marginal tax rate faced under a PP scheme by a parent earning a wage rate w is obtained by
subtracting q=w from the \nominal" value of the marginal tax rate.
23For high-skilled non-parents the marginal tax rate is always zero, irrespective of whether there is
PP or not.
20the labor supply of non-parents tends to increase after the introduction of the PP scheme.
The only relevant exception is in case 2 with the labor supply of low-skilled non-parents
who, as we have already seen, are likely to face a signicantly higher marginal tax rate
under the PP regime when the social welfare function is of the max-min type.
As compared to the PP optimum, the main dierence of the TG solution is that
the marginal tax rate faced by high-skilled parents is always equal to zero since tagging
allows achieving a within-groups no-distortion-at-the-top result. For the within-groups
low-skilled agents, the TG optimum entails in cases 1 and 3 a reduction in the marginal
tax rates as compared to the OT optimum. In case 2, however, low-skilled non-parents
face, under the TG optimum, marginal tax rates that are higher than under the OT
optimum.
To calculate a consumption-based measure of the welfare gains attainable by either
the introduction of the PP scheme or by tagging, we consider an equivalent-variation-type
of welfare gain measure. To obtain it, we proceed as follows. We look for the minimum
amount of extra revenue that should be injected into the government's budget in the OT
problem in order to achieve the same social welfare level under an OT optimum as under
the PP optimum, the TG optimum or the TG+PP optimum.24 Once we have found this
minimum amount of extra revenue, we divide it by the aggregate consumption at the
pure tax optimum in order to get a revenue-based measure of the welfare gains from PP,
from tagging, or from the combined use of PP and tagging. We denote this revenue-based
welfare gain measure by WGr.
Another welfare gain measure that is often used in the literature is the one that is
obtained by calculating the factor  which, when multiplied with the consumption of
all agents in the pre-reform equilibrium (which for us would be the OT equilibrium),
achieves the same level of social welfare as under the post-reform equilibrium (which for
us would be the PP, TG, or TG+PP equilibrium). The welfare gain measure is then
24Formally, let E (T;SW) denote the smallest amount of \money from heaven" needed to achieve the
social welfare level SW when the tax system is T. As our measure of the bents descending from PP















































, where TOT, TPP, TTG and TTG+PP denote respec-
tively the optimal nonlinear tax in the absence of either PP or tagging, the optimal nonlinear-income-tax-
cum-public-provision, the optimal nonlinear-income-tax-cum-tagging, and the optimal nonlinear income
tax supplemented by both tagging and PP.
21obtained as    1. If we had used this alternative way to measure welfare gains, the
estimated benets from either PP or tagging would have been larger than those that
are reported in the tables below. The reason why we have not followed this approach is
that if, starting at the OT equilibrium, one multiplies the consumption of all agents by
a common factor, nothing guarantees that the self-selection constraints are still satised
at the new allocation.25
Tables A5-A10 show that the introduction of PP always increases social welfare and
that the welfare gains are increasing in the proportion of parents in the population. The
welfare gains, measured as percentage of aggregate consumption, vary from a minimum
of 0.68% to a maximum of 8.64%.
The results conrm that the welfare gains are sensitive to the type of self-selection
constraints that are binding at a pure income tax optimum. Moreover, they seem to
suggest that the benecial eects of PP in alleviating the non-parent/parent self-selection
constraints outweigh the detrimental eects of PP in reinforcing the parent/non-parent
self-selection constraints. In fact, PP alleviates two self-selection constraints both in the
\disjoint" case 1 and in the \overlapping" case 2, but in the latter it also tightens one
self-selection constraint; nonetheless, PP delivers larger welfare gains in case 2 than in
case 1. A rationale for this result can be found by noticing that the two self-selection
constraints that are weakened by PP in case 2 are both of the non-parent/parent type,
and we know that PP is very eective in alleviating this type of incentive constraints. In
case 1, on the other hand, only one of the two self-selection constraints weakened by PP
is of the non-parent/parent type; the other is of the parent-parent type, and we know
that on these constraints the eectiveness of PP as a slackening device is lower.
The welfare gains displayed in Tables A1-A6 allows illustrating the eects of the
interaction between the degree of social inequality to aversion and the degree of overlap
between the wage distributions for parents and non-parents. In fact, an increase in the
25Notice that this happens despite the fact that the utility function is separable between leisure and
consumption and logarithmic in consumption. The reason is the presence of both parents and non-
parents. It implies that, whereas to multiply a non-parent's consumption by  we need to multiply
his/her after-tax income B by , to multiply a parent's consumption by  we need to multiply his/her
after-tax income B by a smaller number (equal to q (Y=w)(   1)=B, where Y=w is the labor supply of
the parent at the OT equilibrium). The fact that not all after-tax incomes are multiplied by the same
factor is what determines the possibility that some self-selection constraints are violated. In particular,
one can show that this is the case whenever the OT equilibrium is characterized by binding self-selection
constraints where parents appear as potential mimickers.
22social inequality to aversion has a sizeable eect on the welfare gains from PP only in
cases 2 and 3. The reason has to do with the fact that a max-min social welfare function
strengthens the importance of the self-selection constraint(s) preventing other agents
from mimicking the least well-o members of the society.
In the \overlapping" case 2 this constraint is the one requiring low-skilled non-parents
to be prevented from mimicking the low-skilled parents (who are the least well-o agents).
Accordingly, we nd that switching from a utilitarian to a max-min objective function
more than doubles the welfare gains descending from the introduction of a PP scheme.
In the \disjoint" case 1 it is the high-skilled parents who have to be deterred from
mimicking the least well-o agents (always the low-skilled parents). With a parent/parent
self-selection constraint binding at the bottom of the income distribution, switching from
a utilitarian to a max-min objective function has a minor eect on the welfare gains from
PP.
The \pooling" case 3, where we have three ability types of agents and the intermediate
type is represented by both parents and non-parents, is slightly more complex but the
logic is still the same. Under a utilitarian objective function all agents of ability type 2
(parents and non-parents) are pooled together at the pure income tax optimum. Among
the pooled agents, those who are parents have the steeper indierence curves. Thus,
the tax function implementing the optimal allocation has to be designed to prevent two
types of mimicking behaviors. On one hand, it has to prevent agents of ability type
3 from mimicking non-parents of ability type 2. On the other hand, it has to prevent
parents of ability type 2 from mimicking agents of ability type 1. This represents a
pattern of self-selection constraints very close to the one characterizing the pure income
tax optimum in the \disjoint" case 1. Accordingly, the welfare gains from introducing PP
are, under a utilitarian social welfare function, of the same magnitude as those obtained
in the \disjoint" case 1. However, when the objective function is max-min, we can see
from Table A6 that the solution to the OT problem entails bunching all parents at zero
hours of work. In this case the tax function implementing the optimal allocation has to
be designed to prevent non-parents of ability type 2 from mimicking parents of ability
type 2 (besides preventing agents of ability type 3 from mimicking non-parents of ability
type 2). This pattern of self-selection constraints is similar to the one characterizing
23the pure income tax optimum in the \overlapping" case 2. Accordingly, we nd that
the welfare gains from introducing PP in the \pooling" case 3 are quite large under a
max-min objective function.
In the case of tagging, the possibility to apply dierent tax schedules to non-parents
and parents implies a large transfer of resources from the former group to the latter
with no need to worry about non-parents being tempted to mimic parents. Keeping
this in mind and looking at the results displayed in Tables A1-A6, we can see that also
tagging always entails an overall gain in terms of social welfare and that the welfare
gains are increasing in the proportion of parents in the population. Expressed as a
percentage of aggregate consumption, they vary from a minimum of 1.90% to a maximum
of 8.54%. Even if the welfare gains from tagging tend to be larger than those from PP,
it is interesting to note that there are cases when PP delivers larger welfare gains. This
is for instance the case when the social welfare function is max-min and the distribution
of parents and non-parents across skills is of the pooling type (case 3).
The results from the combined use of tagging and PP show that, once a tagging scheme
is in place, the welfare gains achievable by introducing PP are quite small, ranging from
0% (case 1 under a utilitarian social welfare function) to about 0.9% (cases 2 and 3 under
a max-min social welfare function).
Finally, even if not reported in the tables, we have also performed numerical sim-
ulations trying dierent values for the parameters q and k. Our results indicate that
the welfare gains associated with PP tend to increase when q is increased and tend to
decrease when k is increased (implying a lower compensated elasticity of labor supply).
4. An application to the Swedish economy
In this part of the paper we compare PP and tagging using an empirically driven
simulation approach and considering various possibilities regarding the complexity of the
income tax at disposal of the government.
In accordance with our remark at the beginning of section 2, in our simulation exercise
we dene parents as women with at least one child in day care age. Notice that this has
a crucial implication for the interpretation of our tagging scheme. In particular, the
tagging scheme is not to be interpreted as a scheme that assigns dierent tax schedules
24to families with young children and families without young children, but rather as a
scheme that assigns a dierent tax schedule to women with at least one child in day care
age.
To obtain measures of welfare gains from policy reforms achievable in real economies
we make two modeling assumptions: (i) we choose an empirically relevant utility function;
(ii) we calibrate the wage distribution to Swedish register data using the population
distribution. We rst calculate the welfare gains achievable by PP and tagging when
the income tax is either linear or piecewise-linear. In these settings the welfare gains are
calculated using as a benchmark equilibrium the allocation that one obtains under an
optimal linear income tax. Second, we calculate the welfare gains from PP and tagging
using an extended version of the general income tax model studied in section 2. In this
case the welfare gains are calculated using as a benchmark the allocation obtained under
an optimal nonlinear income tax. The reason for considering various types of income tax
schedules is that the gains from PP (or tagging) might be overstated in the discrete type
fully nonlinear tax model, given that it empowers the government with a (unrealistically)
great deal of sophistication in the design of the tax schedule. Regarding the social welfare
function, we focus on the max-min.26
4.1. Data
Our wage data consists of individuals who worked at least part-time in 2005. Parents
are dened as women with at least one child in day care age (for Sweden this corresponds
to ages one to six); non-parents are dened as all men (with and without children) and
all women without any child in day care age. According to this denition in 2005 the
fraction of parents in Sweden was slightly below 10%.27 As an estimate of the hourly
price for child care we have chosen a price of 40% of the median wage for parents. Since
we have shown that the distribution of users and non-users matters for the welfare gains
26The max-min social welfare criteria avoids confounding the curvature of the individual utility func-
tion and preferences for redistribution and allows for the cleanest possible measure of the welfare gain of
policy reform. This social welfare function is widely applied in the theoretical optimal taxation literature.
27Data has been combined from three sources, \Flergenerationsregistret", \Louise-databasen" and
\Lonestrukturstatistiken". These statistics cover men and women working in the public sector and in
large companies but not in small companies. According to Statistics Sweden there were 2 143 775 women
in the age of 25-60 in Sweden in 2005. Our data set includes 1 457 931 wages for women and 1 519 921
wages for men. Among women, 17.43% had at least one child in day care age. This represents 8.53% of
the entire population.
25achievable through either PP or tagging, we also report results for the case where the
proportion of parents is increased to 15%.28
4.2. Preferences
In order to capture empirically relevant behavioral elasticities and facilitate a tractable
comparison with dierent optimum tax models, we choose the following quadratic spec-
ication of the direct utility function:29
u(c;h) = c2 + (J   h)2 + c(J   h) + (J   h) + c;
where ; < 0, ;; > 0.30 The annual time endowment J is set to 5840 hours. The
labor supply function is:
h =
2J + m +    w(2m + J + )
2(w2 +    w)
;
where m is virtual income and w is the wage rate. Finally, the (uncompensated) elasticity




w2 +    w
 
2J + m + 
2J + m +    w(2y + J + )

:
We consider the parametrization given by  =  1:1,  =  0:0095,  = 0:07,  = 0:95
and  = 2000.31
28A possible interpretation of this exercise is the following. According to Blomquist et al. (2010)
child care services and elderly care services represent the best examples of private goods tting their
model of PP. Applying this idea to our model, the group of users could be thought as being composed
of people with small children and of people with elderly relatives who need to be taken care of. Thus,
increasing the fraction of users from 8 to 15% might be interpreted as a way to measure the welfare gains
achievable by publicly providing both child care- and elderly-care services. Admittedly, the measure
that we get represents only a crude estimate of the welfare eects. The reason is that it rests on two
implicit assumptions that are unlikely to be satised in practice. The rst is that the unitary price of
child care services and the unitary price of elderly care services are the same. The second is that users
either need child-care or elderly-care services but not both at the same time. Notice however that, once
public provision of child care services is supplemented by public provision of elderly care services, the
relative merits of PP, as compared to tagging, are likely to be magnied. The reason is that if one can in
principle think at the implementation of a tagging scheme that oers dierent tax schedules to parents
and non-parents, it seems unfeasible to implement a tagging scheme that discriminates between agents
who have to take care of their older relatives and agents who do not.
29A similar utility function is described by Stern (1986) as a good candidate for representing labor
supply behavior. The quadratic specication has also recently been used by Tuomala (2010) and is
computationally convenient as it permits a closed form solution for the labor supply choice. This is
useful especially when dealing with piece-wise linear tax schedules.
30To ensure concavity we require 4   2 > 0.
31The parameterization is chosen with several features of labor supply behavior in mind. In particular
we want the model to produce empirally relevant substitution- and income eects. We also want the
labor supply curve to imply that individuals work a reasonable fraction of their time endowment.
26The resulting uncompensated labor supply elasticity as a function of the wage rate
is shown in Figure 1. Given that the distribution of wages for parents lies to the left
of the wage distribution for non-parents, and that in the model parents are women
with small children, the parametrization is consistent with the empirical nding that the
labor supply of women with small children is more responsive to taxation.32 The income
elasticities of labor supply are shown in Figure 2. Finally, in Figure 3 the labor supply
function is graphed.33 Compared to parameterizations used in the earlier optimal tax
literature, we believe the implied behavioral elasticities depicted in the graphs do, by and
large, match more closely estimates found in the contemporary empirical labor supply
literature.34








Figure 1: The uncompensated labor supply elasticity  over the support of the wage
distribution.
4.3. Linear and piece-wise linear taxation
To save space we only present here the government's problem when the piece-wise
linear tax is supplemented by a PP scheme. In appendix B we provide a more detailed
32See e.g. the review of the literature provided by Meghir and Phillips (2010).
33The labor supply function is evaluated at (annual) non-labor income of m = 150000 (SEK) which is
of the same order of magnitude as the demogrant arising endogenously in the optimal tax problem.
34One should keep in mind that in this simulation exercise we focus on the labor supply elasticity rather
than on the taxable income elasticity. It should therefore not strike as surprising that the compensated
labor supply elasticity generated by our utility function is decreasing in the wage rate of agents.










Figure 2: The income elasticity of labor supply over the support of the wage distribution.










Figure 3: The labor supply function as a function of hourly wages.
characterization of PP under a linear income tax.35 We approximate the max-min objec-
tive with the maximization of the demogrant. This is always valid when the least well-o
individual does not work. In the case of tagging, the government designs two separate
income tax schedules for the parent and non-parent groups respectively and can transfer
resources across the groups; hence the max-min objective implies for tagging that the
utility of the least well-o individual has to be the same in each group. When these
agents do not work this means that the demogrant is the same for both groups.
As in section 2, let's assume that, in terms of ability types, there are in the population
35Always for space constraints we skip the formal characterization of the government's problem when
tagging supplements a linear- or a piecewise-linear income tax.
28n dierent types of agents with w1 < w2 < ::: < wn:36 The piece-wise linear tax function
is described by four slope parameters t1;t2;t3;t4, and three \break-points" Zi dened as
the points on the x-axis where the slope of T changes. We allow for a demogrant which
is denoted G. This tax function can be described by the set of parameters
pw = f(t1;t2;t3;t4;Z1;Z2;Z3;G) j ti 2 [0;1];Z3 > Z2 > Z1;Zi;G 2 Rg:
Under PP all agents, irrespective of whether they are parents or not, face the same
budget constraint. For any  2 pw the budget constraint of an individual is C(Y ) =
Y   T(Y ;), with T(Y ;) dened as:
T(Y ;) =
8
> > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > :
 G + t1Y Y 2 [0;Z1];
 G + t1Z1 + t2(Y   Z1) Y 2 (Z1;Z2];
 G + t1Z1 + t2(Z2   Z1) + t3(Y   Z2) Y 2 (Z2;Z3];
 G + t1Z1 + t2(Z2   Z1) + t3(Z3   Z2) + t4(Y   Z3) Y > Z3:
Given that Y = wh, agents choose h to maximize U(C(Y );Y ) and this leads to the
following indirect utility function:
V (;w) = U(C(;w);Y (;w)):





















where the proportion of agents of ability type i is i and i 2 [0;1] denotes the proportion
of parents among agents of ability type i.
36In the simulation we approximate the actual wage distributions in the data with n = 1000 taxpayer
types.
29The solution to the problem above yields the optimal piece-wise linear tax schedule
T = T(Y ;), where  solves (8).37 We solve this problem using numerical optimization
techniques38. In order to get a tractable computational exercise we do not optimize over
the break-points but instead take these as exogenously given. The break points are found
by rst solving the linear tax problem and then dividing the resulting income distribution
into four brackets so that, in the linear tax optimum, an equal number of agents report
income within each bracket.39
4.3.1. Results
Table 4.1: Linear and Piece-wise Linear Results
t1 t2 t3 t4 G Welfare Gain
Linear OT 64.97% { { { 154849 {
Linear PP 67.51% { { { 154984 0:06%
Linear Tagging (p) 46.71% { { { 155933
Linear Tagging (np) 66.38% { { { 155933 0:49%
Piece-wise OT 99.39% -1.31% 47.93% 41.33% 191715 16.69%
Piece-wise PP 99.54% -2.20% 48.95% 42.51% 196317 18.77%
Piece-wise TG (p) 75.00% -15.13% 33.68% 31.16% 196452
Piece-wise TG (np) 99.96% 1.75% 49.38% 41.61% 196452 18.83%
The results are reported in Tables 4.1 and 4.2. Regarding the marginal tax rates we
can notice that, under a piecewise linear income tax, they are neither always increasing
nor always decreasing. In all cases they abide by the following pattern: starting with
high marginal tax rates on the rst bracket, they decrease substantially on the second
bracket and from there they follow an inverted U-shaped prole. This is illustrated in
Figure 4 for the OT case.
37This is not a concave programming problem. Although utility is continuous in pw, if the tax
schedule displays in some intervals marginal rate regressivity, the budget set is non-convex and tax
revenue is not continuous. For this reason an algorithmic approach suited for non-smooth problems was
used.
38We represent the population distribution with 1998 agents represented by 999 wage rates from each
group. These correspond to the quantiles of each distribution where we have excluded the extreme values
of each distribution.
39If the (discrete) income distribution is represented by the vector y and the economy is populated by
100 agents, then the break-points chosen would be y25;y50 and y75. Agents are of course free to choose
in which bracket they wish to locate.
















Four Bracket Optimal Income Tax
Figure 4: Optimal marginal tax rates for the four segment tax.
We can also see that both PP and tagging are always welfare-improving, even though
the welfare gain from PP is very small when the income tax is linear. This should not be
surprising and in fact with dierent parameter values one might have even obtained that
PP is welfare-reducing when the government is restricted to a linear income tax. The
reason is that the PP scheme delivers per se large welfare gains to all parents, despite the
fact that the government is in our example only interested in maximizing the well-being
of the least skilled among parents. Under a fully nonlinear income tax the government is
able to adjust the income tax schedule in such a way to oset the welfare gain granted by
PP to the non least skilled parents, while at the same time reaping the benets delivered
by PP in terms of slackened self-selection constraints. On the contrary, under a linear
31income tax the government lacks this exibility in adjusting the income tax schedule.
When a piecewise linear income tax is used, the government recovers at least part of the
exibility. Accordingly, moving from a linear income tax to a 4-brackets piecewise linear
income tax, the dierence between the welfare gains achievable through PP and those
achievable through tagging tends to become virtually negligible.
Comparing the results presented in tables 4.1 and 4.2, we can also see that an hypo-
thetical increase in the proportion of parents strengthens to a similar extent the welfare-
enhancing power of PP and tagging. More precisely, a doubling in the proportion of
parents would generate welfare gains which are, both for PP and for tagging, almost
twice as large than in the baseline scenario.
Finally, Tables 4.1 and 4.2 show that, albeit the welfare gains from PP or tagging
are substantial, much larger welfare gains can be reaped by switching from a linear- to a
4-brackets piecewise-linear income tax.
4.4. General (fully nonlinear) income tax
We extend the model from section 2 by allowing for six types and calibrate these
wages to the data.40 We also employ the utility function presented in section 4.2.
The (hourly) wages are given by:
w = (104:41 110:29 117:71 126:85 138:57 154:11);
where each ability type is represented by a fraction i of the population with:
 = (0:0284 0:3049 0:0284 0:3049 0:0284 0:3049):
Finally, letting i = 1 indicate that type i is a parent, the pattern of parents which
according to our denition arises from the (actual) economy is:41
 = (1 0 1 0 1 0):
40The wage distributions for parents and non-parents are each approximated by three wage levels
corresponding to the 25:th, 50:th and 75:th percentiles of the population distribution. The reason for
not considering more than 6 types is computational, as we cannot rely on the single crossing condition
in the optimal taxation case without PP. We still believe that six types makes possible a fairly accurate
approximation of the wage distributions.
41This pattern resembles more closely the \Case 2" from the theoretical part of the paper.
324.4.1. Results
The results for this case and a max-min social welfare function are summarized in
Tables 4.3 and 4.4 below. After having observed that the welfare gains from both tagging
and PP are increasing in the proportion of parents, the main insight from Table 4.4 is
that the welfare gains from the two schemes are almost identical under a max-min social
welfare function.
Table 4.3: General Nonlinear Tax - Calibrated 8% Parents
p np p np p np
B1 Y1 Y2 Y3 Y4 Y5 Y6
OT 199560 0 216240 0 297300 0 508740
PP 200220 70260 213300 213300 295860 295860 507720
TG 266193 129420 215580 185340 296520 326700 507540
T0(Y 1) T0(Y 2) T0(Y 3) T0(Y 4) T0(Y 5) T0(Y 6)
OT 88.12% 39.94% 89.46% 29.45% 91.05% 0%
PP 100% 41.01% 50.34% 29.73% 43.63% 0%
dist. part 54.91% 41.01% 10.34% 29.73% 9.65% 0%
TG 29.01% 39.91% 21.44% 29.43% 0% 0%
Table 4.4: Welfare Gains for the General Nonlinear Tax
Proportion of Parents
8% 15%
Public Provision 2:55% 4.84%
Tagging 2:69% 5.11%
5. Concluding remarks
Previous literature has shown that, in the presence of a nonlinear income tax, public
provision of complementary-to-labor private goods may be benecial due to its role in
alleviating the self-selection constraints faced by the government when trying to achieve
redistributive goals. In this paper we have extended earlier analyses in three important
respects. First, earlier studies only considered models with uni-dimensional heterogene-
ity. In this paper, focusing on child care services as an example of private good candidate
33for public provision, we have allowed for bi-dimensional heterogeneity, and have assumed
that individuals vary both in terms of productivity and in the need for the publicly pro-
vided good. Second, we have assessed the magnitude of the welfare gains that can be
achieved by public provision of private goods. Third, we have compared the welfare gains
from public provision with the welfare gains achievable through tagging.
To accomplish the rst task we have set up a theoretical model with both people
who need child care, parents, and people who do not need child care, non-parents. In
such a model several types of mimicking behaviors are possible: parents mimicking other
parents, non-parents mimicking parents, non-parents mimicking other non-parents, and
parents mimicking non-parents. When public provision is marginally introduced, -
nanced by increased taxes, the two rst types of self-selection constraints are mitigated.
The third type is unaected while the fourth is reinforced. Therefore, when we have
both a group that needs the publicly provided good and another that does not, it is not
obvious that public provision is welfare-enhancing. Whether public provision is welfare-
enhancing or not depends to a large extent on how the wage distributions for users and
non-users overlap.
A second contribution is that we are the rst to quantitatively assess the welfare
gains of publicly provided child care. This has been done using two dierent types of
models. One highly stylized model has been used to study the sensitivity of results on the
degree of overlap between the wage distributions for parents and non-parents and on the
degree of social inequality to aversion. We have shown that the welfare gains are largest
when three conditions are jointly met: rst, there is a large degree of overlap between
the wage distributions for parents and non-parents; second, parents are on average less
productive than non-parents; third, the social aversion to inequality is high. We have also
used a realistically calibrated model, based on the Swedish wage distribution, to assess
whether the child care provision is welfare-improving or not. We have done this for tax
systems of varying sophistication. We have found that the welfare gains are positive
but almost nil when the income tax at disposal of the government is linear. If however
we add public provision to an optimal nonlinear income tax the welfare gains are about
2.6% of aggregate consumption. Real income tax systems are more sophisticated than a
linear income tax, but not as sophisticated as an optimal nonlinear income tax. We have
34therefore also studied the gains of public provision under an optimal piece-wise linear
tax with 4 segments. The gains are then about 2%.
A third contribution is that we have compared the gains of public provision with
the gains from tagging. We nd this comparison particularly interesting since tagging
schemes and public provision schemes are likely to have very dierent political appeal.
For instance, if one considers child care services as a candidate for public provision, the
tagging counterpart would be a scheme that assigns dierent tax schedules to women
with children in day care ages; not exactly a gender based tax but a variant on the
same theme. Thus, one of the purposes in comparing the eects of public provision and
tagging was to investigate whether public provision could serve as a reasonably good,
but politically more palatable, substitute for tagging schemes. We have found that, even
if public provision seldom outperforms tagging, the dierence in welfare gains tends to
shrink the less the government is constrained in the design of the income tax schedule.
Results from a model calibrated on Swedish data show that, with a general (unrestricted
nonlinear) income tax and a max-min social welfare function, the welfare gains of the
two schemes are almost identical and close to 2.6% of aggregate consumption.
Finally, our analysis has indicated that, albeit the welfare gains from public provision
or tagging are substantial, they are small compared to the gains that can be reaped by
switching from a linear- to a nonlinear income tax (about one sixth).
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37Appendix A. Numerical results
In this appendix the numerical results for the discrete model of section 2 are presented.
The problem was set up in AMPL and then solved using the KNITRO package for
constrained optimization developed by Ziena Optimization Inc. Because the problem is
of the multidimensional heterogeneity type the full set of incentive constraints has been
included in the optimization.
Table A.1: Allocations Nonlinear Taxation (CASE 1, Utilitarian)
Proportion of Parents
0:15 0:30
Type T0(Y ) Y T 0(Y ) Y
OT 22.17 % 0.460 20.42 % 0.507
PP 62.36 % (12.36%) 0.504 61.60 % (11.60%) 0.537
1 (Parent)
TG 2.14 % 0.468 2.50 % 0.494
TG+PP 51.05 % 0.469 51.23 % 0.496
OT 53.63 % 0.460 51.23 % 0.540
PP 61.11 % (25.39%) 0.827 59.37 % (23.66%) 0.885
2 (Parent)
TG 0.00 % 0.856 -0.00 % 0.900
TG+PP 35.71 % 0.863 35.71 % 0.908
OT 14.32 % 1.977 19.82 % 1.989
PP 13.19 % 1.990 17.48 % 2.022
3 (Nonparent)
TG 10.20 % 2.061 11.61 % 2.183
TG+PP 10.20 % 2.061 11.60 % 2.183
OT -0.00 % 3.152 -0.00 % 3.233
PP 0.00 % 3.154 -0.00 % 3.241
4 (Nonparent)
TG 0.00 % 3.202 0.00 % 3.352





38Table A.2: Allocations Nonlinear Taxation (CASE 2, Utilitarian)
Proportion of Parents
0:15 0:30
Type T0(Y ) Y T 0(Y ) Y
OT 36.60 % 0.334 36.50 % 0.356
PP 61.45 % (11.45%) 0.533 61.45 % (11.45%) 0.559
1 (Parent)
TG 8.91 % 0.481 9.88 % 0.499
TG+PP 54.45 % 0.499 54.94 % 0.519
OT 54.90 % 1.192 44.24 % 1.493
PP 64.79 % (40.98%) 1.389 52.16 % (28.35%) 1.641
2 (Parent)
TG 0.00 % 1.753 -0.00 % 1.812
TG+PP 23.81 % 1.779 23.81 % 1.842
OT 13.45 % 1.192 13.99 % 1.233
PP 17.03 % 1.182 21.00 % 1.204
3 (Nonparent)
TG 19.45 % 1.176 21.36 % 1.226
TG+PP 19.42 % 1.176 21.28 % 1.224
OT 0.00 % 3.271 0.00 % 3.285
PP -0.00 % 3.273 -0.00 % 3.320
4 (Nonparent)
TG 0.00 % 3.316 0.00 % 3.424





39Table A.3: Allocations Nonlinear Taxation (CASE 3, Utilitarian)
Proportion of Parents
0:15 0:30
Type T0(Y ) Y T 0(Y ) Y
OT 35.34 % 0.180 32.91 % 0.202
PP 64.69 % (14.69%) 0.240 64.00 % (14.00%) 0.253
1 (Parent)
TG 6.86 % 0.229 7.73 % 0.239
TG+PP 53.41 % 0.235 53.85 % 0.246
OT 9.92 % 0.913 13.14 % 0.915
PP 15.28 % (-9.72%) 0.925 19.26 % (-5.74%) 0.936
2 (Parent)
TG 0.00 % 0.772 -0.00 % 0.803
TG+PP 25.00 % 0.781 25.00 % 0.813
OT 15.91 % 0.913 18.99 % 0.915
PP 15.28 % 0.925 19.26 % 0.936
3 (Nonparent)
TG 11.61 % 0.960 12.94 % 1.006
TG+PP 11.60 % 0.959 12.91 % 1.005
OT 0.00 % 1.569 0.00 % 1.590
PP 0.00 % 1.581 -0.00 % 1.617
4 (Nonparent)
TG 0.00 % 1.600 -0.00 % 1.662





40Table A.4: Allocations Nonlinear Taxation (CASE 1, Max-min)
Proportion of Parents
0:15 0:30
Type T0(Y ) Y T 0(Y ) Y
OT 50.00 % 0.000 50.00 % 0.000
PP 95.81 % (45.81%) 0.166 91.77 % (41.77%) 0.246
1 (Parent)
TG 29.94 % 0.357 30.20 % 0.376
TG+PP 70.76 % 0.429 70.95 % 0.451
OT 64.29 % 0.000 64.29 % 0.000
PP 94.80 % (59.08%) 0.305 89.02 % (53.31%) 0.469
2 (Parent)
TG 0.00 % 0.987 0.00 % 1.033
TG+PP 35.71 % 0.996 35.71 % 1.043
OT 48.68 % 1.635 49.74 % 1.717
PP 48.61 % 1.630 49.47 % 1.696
3 (Nonparent)
TG 48.55 % 1.625 49.40 % 1.691
TG+PP 48.53 % 1.623 49.36 % 1.688
OT -0.00 % 3.244 -0.00 % 3.369
PP -0.00 % 3.235 -0.00 % 3.338
4 (Nonparent)
TG -0.00 % 3.227 0.00 % 3.329





41Table A.5: Allocations Nonlinear Taxation (CASE 2, Max-min)
Proportion of Parents
0:15 0:30
Type T0(Y ) Y T 0(Y ) Y
OT 50.00 % 0.000 50.00 % 0.000
PP 95.78 % (45.78%) 0.175 91.73 % (41.73%) 0.257
1 (Parent)
TG 42.49 % 0.231 42.95 % 0.233
TG+PP 76.84 % 0.401 77.12 % 0.414
OT 49.07 % 1.335 49.39 % 1.384
PP 87.08 % (63.27%) 0.892 78.10 % (54.29%) 1.199
2 (Parent)
TG -0.00 % 1.927 0.00 % 1.983
TG+PP 23.81 % 1.943 23.81 % 1.997
OT 0.00 % 1.281 0.00 % 1.325
PP 56.41 % 0.892 59.88 % 0.899
3 (Nonparent)
TG 58.69 % 0.864 59.46 % 0.890
TG+PP 58.65 % 0.863 59.37 % 0.887
OT 0.00 % 3.247 -0.00 % 3.311
PP 0.00 % 3.366 0.00 % 3.439
4 (Nonparent)
TG 0.00 % 3.355 0.00 % 3.432





42Table A.6: Allocations Nonlinear Taxation (CASE 3, Max-min)
Proportion of Parents
0:15 0:30
Type T0(Y ) Y T 0(Y ) Y
OT 50.00 % 0.000 50.00 % 0.000
PP 96.89 % (46.89%) 0.071 93.79 % (43.79%) 0.105
1 (Parent)
TG 40.88 % 0.121 41.33 % 0.124
TG+PP 76.08 % 0.195 76.36 % 0.202
OT 75.00 % 0.000 75.00 % 0.000
PP 48.47 % (23.47%) 0.760 46.55 % (21.55%) 0.800
2 (Parent)
TG 0.00 % 0.866 0.00 % 0.896
TG+PP 25.00 % 0.874 25.00 % 0.903
OT 50.89 % 0.756 52.02 % 0.793
PP 48.47 % 0.760 46.55 % 0.800
3 (Nonparent)
TG 50.63 % 0.747 51.36 % 0.772
TG+PP 50.60 % 0.746 51.29 % 0.769
OT -0.00 % 1.633 0.00 % 1.696
PP -0.00 % 1.614 -0.00 % 1.651
4 (Nonparent)
TG -0.00 % 1.617 0.00 % 1.659





43Appendix B. Characterization of public provision under a linear income tax
Also for the case of a linear income tax we limit ourselves to the analysis of the
government's problem in the presence of public provision. We then resort to numerical
simulations in order to get a quantitative assessment of the potential welfare-gains de-
scending from the implementation of the public provision scheme. Before proceeding,
however, it will be useful to make a remark about the desirability of a public provision
scheme in a model of linear income taxation. In the rst part of this paper we have
discussed how the public provision scheme that we analyze might be welfare-enhancing
in the presence of a nonlinear income tax due to the eects that it implies on the binding
self-selection constraints. One might then wonder if our public provision scheme still
retains the potential of being welfare-improving in a setting where income is taxed on a
linear scale and therefore no self-selection constraint explicitly appears in the formulation
of the government's problem. The answer would be clearly negative in a setting where
all agents were parents, and therefore users of the publicly provided service. However,
in a setting with both parents and non-parents, the public provision scheme might still
be welfare-enhancing since, as compared with a demogrant, it represents an instrument
which only benets parents. Thus, if the government places a suciently large weight
on the welfare of parents, the public provision scheme might be desirable even in the
presence of a linear income tax.
Under a linear income tax cum public provision, agents solve the problem max
h
u(G + (1   t)wh;h), where G represents the uniform lump-sum transfer paid to all
agents and t is the constant marginal income tax rate. Denoting by V i (t;G) the in-
direct utility of agents of ability type i, the design problem solved by the government





















where  is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the government's budget constraint.


















Dening by bi the net social marginal valuation of a lump-sum transfer to an agent

















Having dened bi we can easily see that condition (B.1) boils down to requiring
E (b) = 1, where E () denotes the expectation operator.43 In other words, it prescribes
that at an optimum the lump-sum component should be adjusted such that b, the gov-
ernment's net social marginal valuation of a transfer of 1e (measured in terms of gov-
ernment's revenue) should on average be equal to its marginal cost (1e).





















Using the Roy's identity
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43Apart from the fact that our denition of bi also incorporates a term depending on q, the condition
E (b) = 1, which implicitly denes the optimal level of the demogrant, is the same that one obtains in a
standard model of optimal linear income taxation without public provision.
45Using the denition of bi and remembering that at an optimum it must be that
E (b) = 1, the condition above reduces to:










@ (1   t)wiiwi; (B.3)
where cov (;) denotes the covariance operator.
Denoting by wi the marginal net wage rate of an agent of ability type i, wi =
(1   t)wi, and by i
h;wi the compensated elasticity of labor, we can rewrite (B.3) as












Notice that in the context of our model with public provision it is no longer possible
to express the condition implicitly dening the optimal value for t in a way as simple as
in a standard model without public provision (see e.g. Sheshinski (1972)). To express
the condition for t in a way that mirrors as closely as possible the standard condition,






















Written in this form, we can see that the second term at the numerator of the left hand
side of (B.5) is the new term that, due to the public provision scheme, enters the formula
that implicitly denes the optimal value for t. In (B.5) i can be interpreted as the
normalized earned income response of agents of ability type i to a marginal compensated
increase in their after-tax wage rate.44 As for qi, it represents the marginal cost, in
terms of higher (public) expenditures on publicly provided services, of an increase in the
income earned by agents of ability type i. Since
n P
i=1
qii is unambiguously positive, the
44The reason why we use the word \normalized" is that at the denominator of the expression dening
i we have the sum of the earned income responses of all agents to a marginal increase in their after-tax
wage rate.
46new term appearing in (B.5) tends to raise the optimal value of t for any given value of
the right side of (B.5).
In our view, however, expressing the condition dening the optimal value for t in
terms of the compensated elasticity of labor, as it is usually done, is in a setting with
public provision not very informative.

































In (B.6) 'i can be interpreted as the normalized earned income response of agents
of ability type i to a marginal compensated increase in the income tax rate. The virtue
of (B.6) is that it denes in a simple way the optimal value of t as the sum of a term
trading o equity and eciency considerations (the rst term on the right side of (B.6))
plus a corrective term given by a weighted average of the qi-marginal costs.
Notice that we have already encountered the qi-marginal costs in section 2.2, when
we characterized the marginal tax rates prevailing at a nonlinear income tax optimum
cum public provision. There, as one can see from (6)-(7), qi (which remember has been
dened as iq=wi) only entered the expression characterizing the marginal tax rate faced
by agents of ability type i. This happened because a nonlinear income tax allowed the
government to let agents of dierent ability type face dierent marginal tax rates. Given
that a linear income tax restricts the government to let all agents face the same marginal
income tax rate, the term
n P
i=1
qi'i can be regarded as the natural counterpart of the
iq=wi appearing in (6)-(7).
47